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Article 2

Is the Human Zygote a Person?
by
Thomas Nelson, M.D.

The author is Consultant for Adult Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry,
Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, Scottsdale, Arizona.

In the June, 2004 edition of Mayo Clinic Proceedings, Louis M
Guenin, J.D., Lecturer on Ethjcs in Science in the Department of
Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, Harvard Medical School, discussed
the morality of embryo use for research.! While rejecting a number of
arguments in favor of embryo use for research as inadequate, he described
embryonjc stem cell research as "virtuous if not obligatory" based upon his
own "argument from nonenablement."2 The gist of Guenin's argument is
that when a woman, "with her partner," declines intrauterine transfer of an
embryo resulting from in vitro fertilization and donates the embryo to
medicine, the embryo is "unenabled" to enter a uterus and develop into an
infant and may be destroyed in the interest of scientific research. He
assumes that an embryo lacking sentience, autonomy, and the ability to
form preferences does not attain a soul; accordingly, he denies zygotic and
embryonic personhood. Furthermore, he asserts that an unenabled embryo
corresponds to no possible person, assuming that the decision to decline
transfer is irrevocable and the embryo has "left parental control."3
Several letters to the editor in response to Guenin's argument,
including one by this author, were published in the September, 2004 Mayo
Clinic Proceedings. 4 I noted that the real issue is the ontological status of
the zygote, since conception is the only reasonable moment of substantial
change and all subsequent change (i.e., embryo, fetus, newborn, etc.)
consists of growth and development, which is accidental change. Since the
zygote differs substantially from the gametes, and is also human and alive,
a human soul is present, since the soul is the principal of life in a material
body and the form of the body. I also noted that the Vatican Document
Donum Vitae (1987) explicitly and presciently rejected the argument from
nonenablement, while affirming the human person as a substantial union of
body and spiritual soul, the immediate creation of the spiritual soul by
God, and the inviolability of the human person from the moment of
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conception. s Another respondent emphasized that the mother lacks the
authority from God to donate an embryo for research. 6 A third respondent
noted that aborted fetuses are unenabled and their tissue, along with that of
other disadvantaged groups with limited abilities to form preferences,
could also be exploited for research. 7
In his reply to these letters in the same issue, Guenin asserted that the
"crucial classification is 'person' ."8 He denied the claim that human life
begins at conception, noting that gametes and other cells are alive before
conception. He also noted that saying a human is a union of body and soul
"says nothing about when that union begins," essentially begging the
question as to the moment in which the spiritual soul is infused and a
human person is present. 9 Personhood is thus the critical category
determining whether the embryo should be respected as inviolable or may
be destroyed for research.
In elaborating his position, Guenin concedes that the embryo before
and after the mother's declination of intrauterine transfer is ontologically
the same, a fact obscured by his renaming the rejected embryo an
"epidosembryo." [o. [[ He then makes a rather convoluted series of claims,
including that the "modern Catholic Magisterium" has turned its back on a
theological tradition of delayed ensoulment, has "abandoned the attempt to
ascertain when a soul infuses," yet "makes it stand on zygotic personhood"
based exclusively on modern genetic science, a position which would
essentially deny that the soul is integral to personhood, since a genome
"suffices for a person."1 2

Actual Versus Possible Person
Because he assumes that the contemporary Churc\l. asserts zygotic
personhood, Guenin does not exploit Catholic theological speculation on
delayed ensoulment as an argument for embryo stem cell research.
Contrary to his claim, the Church has not made a definitive pronouncement
on the moment human personhood is present, and even one of the most
articulate current defenders of Church teaching against embryonic research
concedes the possibility of delayed ensoulment. 13.14 Although Guenin is at
pains to develop his "no possible person" argument against the Church's
insistence that the embryo, even considered as a human life preparing for a
soul (and thus personhood), has sufficient status to be protected, most
embryonic research advocates would not scruple over distinctions between
possible and actual personhood, but simply exploit the fact that the Church
has not definitively committed itself to zygotic or embryonic personhood. [S
Guenin denies actual embryonic personhood in a number of ways.
As noted, he assumes that the embryo's lack of sentience and inability to
form preferences and ends are deficiencies inconsonant with personhood.
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This reveals a lack of appreciation for the distinction between accidental
changes of quantity (growth) and quality (faculty development/use) and
the substantial change of generation (conception) and corruption (death).
Substance is the stable ground upon which accidental change occurs. An
infant is still a person even when not aware or yet able to reason. Even
adults are frequently in states in which sentience, choice, and pursual of
ends are in potency only (e.g. , sleep, anesthesia, etc.).
Obfuscating the crucial distinction between substance and accident,
Guenin claims that having the potential to become something valued is not
the same as being it. "An acorn is not an oak; we, most of us, do not
consider it wrong to sacrifice an unfertilized oocyte."1 6 His analogy of an
embryo to an acorn is correct; the analogy of an embryo to an unfettilized
egg is incorrect. An acorn and an oak tree are the same substance (e.g.,
Quercus borealis) at different stages of development. One may value the
oak's accidental qualities more than that of the acorn 's, but they are the
same substance. The embryo and the man are also the same substance
(Homo sapiens) at different stages of development. One may value the
adult's qualities more than that of the child's or embryo's, but they possess
the same dignity. On the other hand, the oocyte, while admittedly alive and
human, is a part, not a complete substance, and thus not comparable to an
acorn or an embryo. The union of egg and sperm - fertilization - is
conception and the only reasonable moment of substantial generation
when two parts become an individuated whole or substance. "Human
development begins in the zygote stages and unfolds seamlessly from that
stage through a series of natural internally self-directed development
phases. There is no discreet identifiable moment, nor even series of events
after the new organism comes into existence that can be construed as the
beginning of a new organism."1 7 The seamlessness of hpman development
beginning with the zygote involves accidental changes, which, according
to St. Thomas, " ... concern not the being but the well-being of the thing
generated."18 Guenin emphasizes a seamlessness of human life from
gamete to zygote, but is then significantly silent regarding what moment or
series of events is indicative of substantial generation to personhood,
although he is quite sure that this does not occur before implantation, since
nonenablement precludes "the attainment of a soul."19
Guenin does admit the cogency of the argument for protecting "any
possible person corresponding to a developing organism."20 He implies
that "conceptuses enabled in the uterus" are, at least, possible persons, a
status which may be sufficient for protection. Accordingly, he prefers to
keep the focus on the embryo which has been rejected for intrauterine
transfer, to which "no possible person" corresponds. In the process, he is
silent about yet another embryo; namely, the one yet outside the uterus that
is subject to a woman's permissible acceptation of intrauterine transfer.
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Surely, by his reasoning such an embryo is a "possible person" despite the
accident of its current location (petri dish vs. uterus) , unless he means to
assert that implantation itself involves ontological change. This means that
of two ontologically identical embryos in petri dishes, one may be a
"possible person" and protected and the other "no possible person" and
destroyed based exclusively on an intrapsychic event in another actual
person, namely, the mother. As such, this argument is simply the timeworn
pro-abortion argument that the mother's choice trumps everything,
including ontology. The embryo, as with the fetus, is treated as property,
not a person. The implication is that subjective choice even determines
objective reality, indicative of an idealist epistemology and subjectivism
run amuck.
By using the contrasting adjectives "enabled" and
"unenabled," and the contrasting nouns "embryo" and "epidosembryo,"
Guenin misleads the casual reader into thinking something has changed in
the embryo, whereas what has actually changed is the mother's attitude
towards the embryo, which is first permitted to develop as a product of in
vitro fertilization, then not permitted to develop when intrauterine transfer
is declined. Guenin appears to anticipate the potential absurdity of the allimportant status of embryonic possible personhood switching on and off
as a mother changes her mind about intrauterine transfer, so he adds the
qualifiers of (1) irrevocability to her decision and (2) the embryo leaving
her parental control as requisites for his argument from nonenablement.
But why would a woman pursue in vitro fertilization at all if the product
pre-uterine transfer was not already a possible person?
One of Guenin 's other arguments against embryonic personhood can
be easily dismissed. It is his assertion that "an all-loving and all-merciful
God" would agree with his argument from nonenablement! This was
rightly criticized as reading God's mind by one of his rrrspondents. 21 He
does not seem to entertain the possibility that two wrongs do not make a
right. If in vitro fertilization is wrong, embryo destruction can also be
wrong, even if done to relieve human suffering, since the end does not
justify the means. The fact that "we cannot promote any advantage of
epidosembryos" does not compel, require, or justify their deliberate
annihilation. 22
Human Being Versus Human Person

To his credit, Guenin appreciates that the ethical issue in stem cell
research is the personhood of the embryo, which is why he must engage
Catholic thought and teaching, since the very notion of personhood was
refined by the Church in the fourth and fifth centuries in response to
various Christological heresies. As Pope Benedict XVI has written:
" . ..the only way that the concept and idea of 'person' dawned on the
284

Linacre Quarterly

human mind was in the struggle over the Christian image of God and the
interpretation of the figure of Jesus of Nazareth".23
It is this author's contention that conceding a possible delay in
personhood following procreation is actually a profound ontological and
moral loophole that can be exploited by bioethicists such as Guenin , as
well as others who would not have hi s scruples about possible persons.
Ultimately, the category of possible person is irrelevant if the "crucial
classification" is personhood, since, logically, a possible person is actually
a nonperson. Accordingly, the issue of the actual personhood of the zygote
and embryo is of critical and ultimate relevance for their defense. It will be
important to review what the Magisterium actually teaches in this regard.
Before undertaking such a review, it is important to clarify terms.
According to the classic definition by Boethius, a person is an individual
substance of a rational nature, a definition which clearly precludes
consideration of cells, tissues, or organs as persons, since they are not
substances but partS. 24 In actuality, the notion of person is not subject to
strict definition, since person denotes a "who," not a "what." Person
conveys the ineffability of a unique and incommunicable identity, not just
the essential attributes indicative of a class or group. Again, Pope Benedict
XVI: "In this idea of relatedness in word and love, independent of the
concept of substance and not to be classified among the ' accidents,'
Christian thought discovered the kernel of the concept of person, which
describes something other and infinitely more than the mere idea of the
'individual' ."25 As more than an individual, a human person is both subject
to and subjugates human nature, whereas "human being" refers to just the
individualized nature. The former is a who with a what; the latter is just an
individualized what, like a particular plant. The Church's notion of
personhood is more profound than that advanced by Guenirf, who, adopting a
pragmatic criterion of truth, reduces personhood to shorthand for how we
should treat something for a given purpose, which implies that personhood
is conferred by social consensus, not recognized as naturally inherent. 26
Consistent with the Church's notion of personhood, a being that is a
possible but not actual human person, although individual and a substance,
could not possess a rational or intellectual nature, which is the definitive
note of personhood distinguishing man from animal. If there is no
intellectual nature, there is no intellectual soul, since the soul is the
principle of life in a material body and the form of the bodyy,28 Form is
the determining principle in a material being, responsible for its
"whatness." Accordingly, the hypothetical embryo, which may for awhile
be a possible person but not an actual person and is devoid of an
intellectual soul, must have an animal soul - more likely just a vegetable
soul. This kind of soul (and there is only one soul) is material, educed from
the potency of prime matter and reduced to the potency of prime matter
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with substantial change; i.e., death. 29 This begs the question as to in what
wayan entity with a corruptible soul is even human if the very hallmark of
human nature is absent, namely, an intellectual nature. For man, an
intellectual nature requires a spiritual or incorruptible soul, since
intellection cannot be reduced to a material organ. In actuality, an entity
which is a possible person but not actually a person would be formally
indistinguishable from a plant or animal and thus certainly not unique or
incommunicable, irregardless of the human origin of its material cause;
i.e., human gametes.
Postulating an alive, human entity intervening between conception
and human personhood might underscore the continuity of human life in
human reproduction, but such an entity would testify to a discontinuity of
human persons in procreation, suggesting that new human personhood is
something that occurs later between God and parental biological material
or, worse, arises from biological material alone, rather than something
whose source is immediately, essentially and proximately personal: God,
man and wife. The idea of "human life" is an abstraction from actual living
human persons. In Aristotelian terms, an individual man is a first substance
and life is a universal or second substance. Pope John Paul II explicitly
stated that God's own image and likeness is transmitted in procreation,
"thanks to the creation of the immortal soul," and he refers to many
Biblical passages that speak of "the intimate connection between the initial
moment of life and the action of God the Creator."30 What can this action
be other than the infusion of the spiritual soul, the ontological ground of
personhood? A possible person but actual nonperson would not be made in
the image and likeness of God, Who is a Trinity of Persons. In vitro
fertilization is abhorrent because it does not reflect that persons come from
persons. Contraception is abhorrent because it makes tMe act of union
between two persons impersonal in its import.

What does the Magisterium Say?
It is important to now review authoritative Church statements
regarding the human embryo, statements which will be seen to move
tantalizingly close to declaring the human zygote a person.
The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Declaration
on Procured Abortion (1974) clearly states that ensoulment is a
philosophical and moral problem not under the competence of scienceY
Its defense of the embryo rests on two arguments: (1) if there is delayed
ensoulment, human life still precedes ensoulment and must be respected;
(2) " ... even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of conception is
already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk
murder."32 I have just discussed the problems inherent to the first
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argument. It overemphasizes the continuity of parental life in human
procreation at the price of attenuating the substantial change of human
generation to new being. It is also not persuasive for bioethicists like
Guenin who make their stand on personhood. It is essentially the argument
that the embryo is precious because it uniquely may become a human
person and is a "possible person," and so is worthy of protection, an
argument Guenin counters by his assertion that the unenabled embryo has
no such destiny. As previously discussed, he counters the second argument
that the embryo may actually be a person with a number of, ultimately,
ineffecti ve counterarguments.
Guenin attributes two actually contradictory positions to the
Magistelium: (1) it has declared that ensoulment is a matter that will never
be established; (2) it has declared that a person is a genome. 33 .34 Both
attributions are incorrect. Regarding the first, the pertinent passage he
cites, footnote 19 from the Declaration on Procured Abortion, states that
ensoulment " ... .is a philosophical problem from which our moral
affirmation remains independent for two reasons: (1) supposing a belated
animation, there is still nothing less than a human life, preparing for and
calling for a soul in which the nature received from parents is completed;
(2) on the other hand, it suffices that this presence of a soul be probable
(and one can never prove the contrary) in order that the taking of life
involved accepting the risk of killing a man, not only waiting for, but
already in possession of his soul."35 Another translation of the second point
reads " .. .. on the other hand, it suffices that the presence of this soul be
probable (and the contrary will never be established) in order that .. .. "36 In
other words, the Declaration actually says it can never be proved that the
soul is not present, not that the presence of the soul can never be
,
established, which is Guenin's claim.37
With regard to Guenin's second attribution, that the Church has
declared a person is a genome, the Declaration merely states that modem
genetic science "brings valuable confirmation" to the "perpetual evidence"
that fertilization starts "the life of a new human being with its own growth,"
a life distinct from the parents. 38 Science is thus employed in support of the
"perpetual evidence" of philosophical analysis that life begins at
conception, a moment of substantial generation of a new human being, a
fact which constitutes the Declaration's first argument in defense of the
embryo. The new genome may be a sign of human personhood, arguably
the material cause, but certainly not the formal cause, which is the soul.
The Declaration does not assert personhood based upon a new genome.
The key passage regarding the personhood of the zygote in The
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Instruction on Respect
for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (Donum
Vitae, 1987) reaffirms that ensoulment is not under the purview of science:
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287

"Certainly, no experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to
the recognition of a spiritual soul; neveltheless, the conclusions of science
regarding the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning
by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of this first
appearance of a human life: how could a human individual not be a human
person?"39 (emphasis added) While acknowledging that the Magisterium
"has not expressly committed itself to an affirmation of a philosophical
nature" regarding zygotic personhood, this passage forcefully asserts the
plausibility that the human zygote actually is a person, which would
support the Declaration's second argument in defense of the embryo.40
This assertion is based upon the use of reason (i.e., philosophical thought),
which science subserves by measuring quantifiable aspects of material
change. This is not science "proving" personhood; rather, it is science in
its proper role assisting common sense to identify the presence of a new
substance or the physical correlates of a substantial change. Philosophical
notions such as substance, in turn, subserve theology (as in the doctrine of
Transubstantiation). Identifying the presence of a new substance does not
prove the infusion of an immortal soul by God; such an event is accessible
to faith alone. Science and philosophy can support faith, but do not replace
it.
Having moved to the brink of declaring that the human zygote is a
person based on philosophical principles, Donum Vitae insists that it be
treated as a person: "The human being is to be respected and treated as a
person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same
moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first
place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life."41 Note
that respect for human life follows from the assumption of human
personhood; human personhood is not described as sOIlfething secondary
to, or later than, human life. Donum Vitae also explicitly rejects the
argument from nonenablement: "The law cannot tolerate - indeed it must
expressly forbid - that human beings, even at the embryonic stage, should
be treated as objects of experimentation, be mutilated or destroyed with the
excuse that they are superfluous or incapable of developing normally"
(emphasis added).42
The papal encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae (1995), quotes the
passage from Donum Vitae containing the crucial interrogative, "how could
a human individual not be a human person?", but reiterates that the
Magisterium has not "expressly committed itself' to a philosophical
affirmation of personhood for the result of human procreation from the first
moment of its existence; i.e., the zygote. 43 Nevertheless, Pope John Paul II
appears to assume the personhood of the zygote in several passages. He
refers to the modern tendency to "disguise certain crimes against life in its
early or final stages by using innocuous medical terms which distract
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attention from the fact that what is involved is the right to life of an actual
human person."44 In referring to the Church's "desire to promote a human
State," he asserts the "unconditional respect for the right to life of every
innocent person - from conception to natural death" as a pillar for civil
society.45
Development of Doctrine?
Given the challenge to the personhood of the zygote as reflected by
pervasive embryonic stem cell research, the denial of such personhood by
many bioethicists, and the grave implications of such nonrecognition for
the temporal and eternal existence of countless tiny human beings, is not
this the moment for an authoritative development of Church doctrine on
the personhood of the product of human procreation from the first moment
of its existence? Such a development would not imply a new addition to
the deposit of faith or merely a syllogistic conclusion drawn from that
deposit, but rather a making explicit of what is implicit in Church teaching
from the beginning, an uncovering of the recondite and a manifestation of
the import of its perennial teaching in the face of modem challenges to
personhood. 46 The Church's (1) venerable teaching on the sanctity of
human life from the moment of conception, (2) proscription of abortion at
any stage, (3) development of the very notion of person in response to
Christologicai heresies, (4) deliberate employment of the word procreation, and (5) insistence that the zygote be treated as a person are a
sufficient basis upon which to affirm that the product of conception, the
human zygote, is a person. Such an affirmation would be consistent with
modem science, philosophically reasonable, and theologically consonant
with progressive statements ofthe Magisterium. It also appears practically
imperative in the face of embryonic stem cell research, abortifacient pills,
in vitro fertilization, human cloning, heterologous embryo transfer, and the
whole vast panoply of modem assaults on the sanctity of human
procreation.
Is it quixotic to anticipate a future declaration of the Magisterium to
the effect that under the exigencies of modem assaults on personhood,
consistent with the deposit of faith, and making explicit what is implicit in
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, "a complete, rational, human
soul is infused directly by God at the first moment of human conception
and a human person is immediately present who is destined to exist for all
eternity"?
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